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Abstract 
Numerous, artificially intelligent, networked things will pop-
ulate the battlefield of the future, operating in close collabo-
ration with human warfighters, and fighting as teams in 
highly adversarial environments. This paper explores the 
characteristics, capabilities and intelligence required of such 
a network of intelligent things and humans – Internet of Bat-
tle Things (IOBT). It will experience unique challenges that 
are not yet well addressed by the current generation of AI and 
machine learning. 
 Introduction   
 Internet of Intelligent Battle Things is the emerging reality 
of warfare. A variety of networked intelligent systems –
things – will continue to proliferate on the battlefield, where 
they will operate with varying degrees of autonomy. Intelli-
gent things will not be a rarity but a ubiquitous presence on 
the future battlefield. (Scharre 2014)  
 Most of such intelligent things will not be too dissimilar 
from the systems we see on today’s battlefield, such as un-
attended ground sensors, guided missiles (especially the 
fire-and-forget variety) and of course the unmanned aerial 
systems (UAVs). They will likely include physical robots 
ranging from very small size (such as an insect-scale mobile 
sensors) to large vehicle that can carry troops and supplies. 
Some will fly, others will crawl or walk or ride. Their func-
tions will be diverse. Sensing (seeing, listening, etc.) the bat-
tlefield will be one common function. Numerous small, au-
tonomous sensors can cover the battlefield and provide an 
overall awareness to the warfighters that is reasonably com-
pete and persistent (Fig. 1).   
 Other things might acts as defensive devices, e.g., auton-
omous active protection systems (Freedberg 2016). Finally, 
there will be munitions that are intended to impose physical 
or cyber effects on the enemy. These will not be autono-
                                                 
 
 
mous. Instead, they will be controlled by human warfight-
ers. This assumes that the combatants of that future battle-
field will comply with a ban on offensive autonomous weap-
ons beyond meaningful human control. Although the US 
Department of Defense already imposes strong restrictions 
on autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems 
(Hall 2017), nobody can predict what other countries might 
decide on this matter.  
 In addition to physical intelligent things, the battlefield – 
or at least the cyber domain of the battlefield -- will be pop-
ulated with disembodied, cyber robots. These will reside 
within various computers and networks, and will move and 
acts in the cyberspace. Just like physical robots, the cyber 
robots will be employed in a wide range of roles. Some will 
protect communications and information (Stytz et al. 2005) 
or will fact-check, filter and fuse information for cyber situ-
ational awareness (Kott et al. 2014). Others will defend elec-
tronic devices from effects of electronic warfare. These de-
fensive actions might include creation of informational or 
electromagnetic deceptions or camouflage. Yet others will 
act as situation analysts and decision advisers to the humans 
or physical robots. In addition to these defensive or advisory 
roles, cyber robots might also take on more assertive func-
tions, such as executing cyber actions against the enemy sys-
tems (Fig. 2).   
 In order to be effective in performing these functions, bat-
tle things will have to collaborate with each other, and also 
with the human warfighters. This will require a significant 
degree of autonomous self-organization; and also of accept-
ing a variety of relations between things and humans, e.g., 
from complete autonomy of an unattended ground sensor to 
a tight control of certain systems, and these modes will have 
to change flexibly as needed. Priorities, objectives, and rules 
of engagement will change rapidly, and intelligent things 
will have to adjust accordingly (Kott et al. 2016).  
 
 Clearly, these requirements imply a high degree of intel-
ligence on part of the things. Particularly important is the 
necessity to operate in a highly adversarial environment, i.e., 
intentionally hostile and not merely randomly dangerous 
world. The intelligent things will have to constantly think 
about an intelligent adversary that strategizes to deceive and 
defeat them. Without this adversarial intelligence, the battle 
things will not survive long enough to be useful. 
Figure 1 Networked teams of intelligent things and humans will 
operate in extremely complex, challenging environment: unstruc-
tured, unstable, rapidly changing, chaotic, rubble-filled, adver-
sarial and deceptive. 
The Challenges of Autonomous Intelligence on 
the Battlefield 
The vision – or rather the emerging reality -- of the battle-
field populated by intelligent things, portends a multitude of 
profound challenges. While use of AI for battlefield tasks 
has been explored on multiple occasions, e.g., (Rasch et al. 
2002), and AI makes things individually and collectively 
more intelligent, it also makes the battlefield harder to un-
derstand and to manage. Human warfighters have to face a 
much more complex, more unpredictable world where 
things have the mind of their own and perform actions that 
may appear inexplicable to the humans. Direct control of 
such intelligent things becomes impossible or limited to 
cases of decisions whether to take a specific destructive ac-
tion. 
 On the other hand, humans complicate the life for intelli-
gent things. Human and things think differently. Intelligent 
things, in the foreseeable future, will be challenged in un-
derstanding and anticipating human intent, goals, lines of 
reasoning and decisions. Humans and things will remain 
largely opaque to each other. And yet, things will be ex-
pected to perceive, reason and act while taking into account 
the social, cognitive and physical needs of their human 
teammates. Furthermore, things will often deal with humans 
who are experiencing extreme physical and cognitive stress, 
and therefore may behave differently from what can be as-
sumed from observing humans under more benign condi-
tions 
 An intelligent thing will need to deal with a world of 
astonishing complexity. The sheer number and diversity of 
things – and humans – within the IoBT will be enormous. 
The number of connected things, for example within a future 
Army brigade, is likely to be several orders of magnitude 
greater than in current practice. This, however, is just the 
beginning. Consider that intelligent things belonging to such 
a brigade will inevitably interact – willingly or unwillingly 
-- with things owned and operated by other parties, such as 
those of the adversary or owned by the surrounding civilian 
population. If the brigade operates in a large city, where 
each apartment building can contains thousands of things, 
the overall universe of connected things grows to enormous 
numbers. Million things per square kilometer is not an un-
reasonable expectation (Fig. 2).  
 The above scenario also points to a great diversity of 
things within the overall environment of the battlefield. 
Things will come from different manufacturers, with differ-
ent designs, capabilities, and purposes, configured or ma-
chine-learned differently, etc. No individual thing will be 
able to use pre-conceived (pre-programmed, pre-learned, 
etc.) assumptions about behaviors or performance of other 
things it meets on the battlefield. Instead, behaviors and 
characteristics will have to be learned and updated autono-
mously dynamically during the operations. That includes 
humans – yes, humans are a specie of things, in a way – and 
therefore the behaviors and intents of humans, such as 
friendly warfighters, adversaries, and civilians and so on, 
will have to be continually learned and inferred.   
 The cognitive processes of both things and humans will 
be severely challenged in this environment of voluminous 
and heterogeneous information. Rather than the communi-
cations bandwidth, the cognitive bandwidth may become the 
most severe constraint. Both humans and things seek infor-
mation that is well-formed, reasonably sized, essential in na-
ture, and highly relevant to their current situation and mis-
sion. Unless information is useful, it does more harm than 
good. The trustworthiness of the information and the value 
of information arriving from different sources, especially 
other things, will be highly variable and generally uncertain. 
For any given intelligent thing, the incoming information 
could contain mistakes, erroneous observations or conclu-
sions made by other things, or intentional distortions – de-
ceptive information – produced by an adversary malware re-
siding on friendly things or otherwise inserted into the envi-
ronment.  Both humans and things are susceptible to decep-
tion, and humans are likely to experience cognitive chal-
lenges when surrounded by opaque things that might be 
feeding the humans with untrustworthy information (Kott 
and Alberts 2017). 
 This reminds us that the adversarial nature of the battle-
field environment is a concern of exceptional importance, 
above all others. The intelligent things will have to deal with 
an intelligent, capable adversary. The adversary will apply 
to things physical destruction, either by means such as gun-
fire, also known as “kinetic” effects, or by using directed 
energy weapons. The adversary will be jamming the chan-
nels of communications between things, and between things 
and humans. The adversary will deceive things by present-
ing them with misleading information. Recent research in 
adversarial learning comes to mind in this connection (Pa-
pernot et al. 2016). Perhaps most dangerously, the adversary 
will attack intelligent things by depositing malware on them.   
 
Figure 2 Networks of the opponents will fight each other with 
cyber and electromagnetic attacks of great diversity and volume; 
most of such offensive and defensive actions will be performed by 
autonomous cyber agents. 
AI will Fight the Cyber Adversary  
A key assumption that must be taken regarding the IoBT is 
that in a conflict with a technically sophisticated adversary, 
IoBT will be a heavily contested battlefield (Kott 2015). En-
emy software cyber agents -- malware -- will infiltrate our 
network and attack our intelligent things. To fight them, 
things will need artificial cyber hunters - intelligent, auton-
omous, mobile agents specialized in active cyber defense 
and residing on IoBT.  
 Such agents will stealthily patrol the networks, detect the 
enemy malware while remaining concealed, and then de-
stroy or degrade the enemy malware. They will do so mostly 
autonomously, because human cyber experts will be always 
scarce on the battlefield. They will be adaptive because the 
enemy malware is constantly evolving. They will be stealthy 
because the enemy malware will try to find and kill them. 
At this time, such capabilities do not exist but are a topic of 
research (Theron et al. 2018)). Here, let’s explore the de-
sired characteristics of an intelligent autonomous agent op-
erating in the context of IoBT. 
 We consider a thing – a simple senor or a complex mili-
tary vehicle -- with one or more computers residing on the 
thing. Each computer contributes considerably into opera-
tion of the thing or systems installed on the thing. One or 
more of the computers are assumed to have been compro-
mised, where the compromise is either established as a fact, 
or is suspected.  
 Due to the contested nature of the communications envi-
ronment (e.g., the enemy is jamming the communications or 
radio silence is required to avoid detection by the enemy), 
communications between the thing and other elements of the 
friendly force can be limited and intermittent. Under some 
conditions, communications are entirely impossible.  
 
 Given the constraints on communications, conventional 
centralized cyber defense is infeasible. (Here centralized 
cyber defense refers to an architecture where local sensors 
send cyber-relevant information to a central location, where 
highly capable cyber defense systems and human analysts 
detect the presence of malware and initiate corrective ac-
tions remotely). It is also unrealistic to expect that the human 
war-fighters in the vicinity of the thing (if such exist) have 
the necessary skills or time available to perform cyber de-
fense functions for that thing.   
 Therefore, cyber defense of the thing and its computing 
devices has to be performed by an intelligent, autonomous 
software agent. The agent (or multiple agents per thing) 
would stealthily patrol the networks, detect the enemy 
agents while remaining concealed, and then destroy or de-
grade the enemy malware. The agent has to do so mostly 
autonomously, without support or guidance of a human ex-
pert.  
 In order to fight the enemy malware deployed on the 
friendly thing, the agent often has to take destructive actions, 
such as deleting or quarantining certain software. Such de-
structive actions are carefully controlled by the appropriate 
rules of engagement, and are allowed only on the computer 
where the agent resides. The agent may also be the primary 
mechanism responsible for defensive cyber maneuvering (of 
which mobbing target defense is an example), deception, 
e.g., redirection of malware to honeypots (De Gaspari et al. 
2016), self-healing, e.g., (Azim et al. 2014), and other such 
autonomous or semi-autonomous behaviors (Jajodia et al. 
2011). 
 The actions of the agent, in general, cannot be guaranteed 
to preserve availability of integrity of the functions and data 
of friendly computers. There is a risk that an action of the 
agent may “break” the friendly computer, disable important 
friendly software, or corrupt or delete important data. This 
risk, in a military environment, has to be balanced against 
the death or destruction caused by the enemy if the agent’s 
action is not taken.    
 Provisions are made to enable a remote or local human 
controller to fully observe, direct and modify the actions of 
the agent. However, it is recognized that human control is 
often impossible, especially because of intermittent commu-
nications. The agent, therefore, is able to plan, analyze and 
perform most or all of its actions autonomously. Similarly, 
provisions are made for the agent to collaborate with other 
agents (who reside on other computers); however, in most 
cases, because the communications are impaired or ob-
served by the enemy, the agent operates alone. 
 The enemy malware, and its capabilities and techniques, 
evolve rapidly. So does the environment in general, together 
with the mission and constraints that the thing is subject to. 
Therefore, the agent is capable of autonomous learning. 
 Because the enemy malware knows that the agent exists 
and is likely to be present on the computer, the enemy mal-
ware seeks to find and destroy the agent. Therefore, the 
agent possesses techniques and mechanisms for maintaining 
a degree of stealth, camouflage and concealment. More gen-
erally, the agent takes measures that reduce the probability 
that the enemy malware may detect the agent. The agent is 
mindful of the need to exercise self-preservation and self-
defense. 
 It is assumed here that the agent resides on a computer 
where it was originally installed by a human controller or by 
an authorized process. We do envision a possibility that an 
agent may move itself (or move a replica of itself) to another 
computer. However, such propagation is assumed to occur 
only under exceptional and well-specified conditions, and to 
take place only within friendly network – from one friendly 
computer to another friendly computer. This brings to mind 
the controversy about “good viruses.” Such viruses have 
been proposed, criticized and dismissed earlier (Muttik 
2016). These criticisms do not apply here. This agent is not 
a virus because it does not propagate except under explicit 
conditions within authorized and cooperative nodes. It is 
also used only in military environments where most usual 
concerns do not apply. 
AI will have to Advance Significantly 
Agents will have to become useful team-mates – not tools -
- of human warfighters on a highly complex and dynamic 
battlefield. Consider Fig. 1 that depicts an environment in 
which a highly-dispersed team of human and intelligent 
agents (including but not limited to physical robots) is at-
tempting to access a multitude of highly heterogeneous and 
uncertain information sources, and use them for forming sit-
uational awareness and making decision (Kott et al. 2011), 
all while trying to survive extreme physical and cyber 
threats. They must be effective, in this unstructured, unsta-
ble, rapidly changing, chaotic, rubble-filled adversarial en-
vironments; learning in real-time, under extreme time con-
straints, with only a few observations that are potentially er-
roneous, of uncertain accuracy and meaning, or even inten-
tionally misleading and deceptive (Fig. 3).  
 Clearly, it is far beyond the current state of AI to operate 
intelligently in such an environments and with such de-
mands. In particular, Machine Learning – an area that has 
seen a dramatic progress in the last decade – must experi-
ence major advances in order to become relevant to the real 
battlefield.  Let’s review some of the required advances. 
 Learning with very small number of samples is clearly a 
necessity in an environment where the enemy and friends 
change the tactics continuously, and the environment itself 
is highly fluid, rich with details, dynamic and changing rap-
idly. Furthermore, very few if any of the available samples 
will be labelled, or at least not in a very helpful manner.  
 Figure 3 . AI-enabled agents -- members of a human-agent team 
– will rapidly learn in ever-changing, complex environments, 
providing the team’s commander with real-time estimates of en-
emy, reasoning on possible courses of action, and tactically sen-
sible decision. 
 A typical sample might be a video snippet of events and 
physical surroundings or a robot, for example, where the 
overwhelming majority of elements (e.g., pieces of rubble) 
are hardly relevant and potentially misleading for the pur-
poses of learning. The information of the samples is likely 
to be highly heterogeneous of nature. Depending on circum-
stances, samples might consist of one or more of the follow-
ing: still images in various parts of the spectrum (IR, visible, 
etc.); video; audio; telemetry data; solid models of the envi-
ronment; records of communications between agents; and so 
on. 
 Some samples may be misleading in general, even if un-
intentionally (e.g., an action succeeds even though an un-
suitable action is applied) and the machine learning algo-
rithms will have to make the distinction between relevant 
and irrelevant, instructive and misleading. In addition, some 
of the samples might be a product of intentional deception 
by the enemy. In general, issues of Adversarial Learning and 
Adversarial Reasoning are of great importance (Papernot et 
al. 2016). 
 Yet another challenge that is uniquely exacerbated by bat-
tlefield conditions are constraints on the available electric 
power. Most successful AI relies on vast computing and 
electrical power resources including cloud-computing 
reach-back when necessary. The battlefield AI, on the other 
hand, must operate within the constraints of edge devices, 
such as small sensors, micro-robots, and handheld radios of 
warfighters. This means that computer processors must be 
relatively lights and small, and as frugal as possible in the 
use of electrical power. One might suggest that a way to 
overcome such limitations on computing resources available 
directly on the battlefield is to offload the computations via 
wireless communications to a powerful computing resource 
located outside of the battlefield.  Unfortunately, it is not a 
viable solution, because the enemy’s inevitable interference 
with friendly networks will limit the opportunities for use of 
reach-back computational resources.  
 A team that includes multiple warfighters and multiple ar-
tificial agents must be capable of distributed learning and 
reasoning. Besides distributed learning, these include such 
challenges as: multiple decentralized mission-level task al-
location; self-organization, adaptation, and collaboration; 
space management operations; and joint sensing and percep-
tion. Commercial efforts to date have been largely limited to 
single platforms in benign settings. Military-focused pro-
grams like the MAST CTA (Piekarski et al. 2017), have 
been developing collaborative behaviors for UAVs. Ground 
vehicle collaboration is challenging and is largely still at the 
basic research level at present. In particular, to address such 
challenges, a new collaborative research alliance called Dis-
tributed and Collaborative Intelligent Systems and Technol-
ogy (DCIST) has been initiated (https://dcist-cra.org/). Note 
that the battlefield environment imposes yet another compli-
cation: because the enemy interferes with communications, 
all this collaborative, distributed AI must work well even 
with limited, intermittent connectivity.  
Humans in the Ocean of Things 
In this vision of the future warfare, a key challenge is to en-
able autonomous systems and intelligent agents to effec-
tively and naturally interact across a broad range of warf-
ighting functions. Human-agent collaboration is an active 
ongoing research area. It must address such issues as trust 
and transparency, common understanding of shared percep-
tions, and human-agent dialog and collaboration.  
 One seemingly relevant technology is Question Answer-
ing—the system’s ability to respond with a relevant, correct 
information to a clearly stated question. Successes of com-
mercial technologies of question-answering are indisputa-
ble. They work well for very large, stable, and fairly accu-
rate volumes of data, e.g., encyclopedias. But such tools 
don't work for rapidly changing battlefield data, also dis-
torted by adversary's concealment and deception. They can-
not support continuous, meaningful dialog in which both 
warfighters and artificially intelligent agents develop shared 
situational awareness and intent understanding. Research is 
being performed to develop human-robotic dialog technol-
ogy for warfighting tasks, using natural voice, which is crit-
ical for reliable battlefield teaming.  
 A possible approach to developing the necessary capabil-
ities – both human and AI – is to train a human-agent team 
in immersive artificial environments. This requires building 
realistic, intelligent entities in immersive simulations. Train-
ing (for humans) and learning (for agents) experiences must 
exhibit high degree of realism to match operational de-
mands. Immersive simulations for human training and ma-
chine learning must have physical and sociocultural interac-
tions with high fidelity and realistic complexity of the oper-
ational environment. These include realistic behaviors of 
human actors (friendly warfighters, enemies, non-combat-
ants), and interactions and teaming with robots and other in-
telligent agents. In today’s video games, these interactions 
are limited and not suitable for simulating real battlefield. 
Advances in AI are needed to drive the character behaviors 
that are truly realistic, diverse, and intelligent.  
 To this end, some of the cutting-edge efforts in computer-
generation of realistic virtual characters are moving towards 
what would be needed to enable realistic interactions in an 
artificial immersive battlefield. For example, Hollywood 
studios on a number of occasions sought technologies of the 
Army-sponsored Institute for Creative Technologies 
(http://ict.usc.edu/)to create realistic avatars of actors. These 
technologies enable film creators to digitally insert an actor 
into scenes, even if that actor is unavailable, much older or 
younger, or deceased. That’s how actor Paul Walker was 
able to appear in “Fast and Furious 7,” even though he died 
partway into filming (CBS News 2017). 
Summary 
Intelligent things – networked and teamed with human warf-
ighters – will be a ubiquitous presence on the future battle-
field. Their appearances, roles and functions will be highly 
diverse. The artificial intelligence required for such things 
will have to be significantly greater than what is provided 
by today’s AI and machine learning technologies. Adversar-
ial – strategically and not randomly dangerous -- nature of 
the battlefield is a key driver of these requirements. Com-
plexity of the battlefield – including the complexity of col-
laboration with humans – is another major driver. Cyber 
warfare will assume a far greater importance, and it will be 
AI that will have to fight cyber adversaries. Major advances 
in areas such as adversarial learning and adversarial reason-
ing will be required. Simulated immersive environments 
may help to train the humans and to train AI. 
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